Research paints a bleak picture regarding the organizational consequences of shareholder agreements. These legally binding contracts typically contain management and ownership provisions wherein participating shareholders agree to collude in a pre-determined manner. In most enterprises, this is detrimental to performance, however there is early evidence that the opposite is true for family firms. External investors tend to be wary of family firms operating without such an agreement to protect against costly demands from family shareholders, making this emerging area of research a priority for future study. Join us to learn more about the implications for your firm.
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Peter Jaskiewicz conducts quantitative and qualitative research on entrepreneurship and family business. His current research focuses on antecedents of transgenerational entrepreneurship and corporate reputation in family and founder firms. Moreover, Peter researches organizational outcomes of entrepreneurial legacies, managerial pay dispersion, and family dynamics in these firms.
Peter's research has been published in journals such as Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Business Venturing, Academy of Management Learning & Education, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Family Business Review, Journal of Small Business Management, and Journal of Business Research. Read More >